Campbell biology p1045: the detection and processing of sensory information and the generation of motor output provide the physiological basis for all animal behaviour… when animals are in motion, they are probing the environment through that motion, sensing changes, and using the information to generate the next action. This is a continuous cycle..
- philosophy has been based on static models of thinking and sensing for too long. The new philosophy will require an understanding of the biology underlying our thinking and action.
P1050 – spatial orientation set by the ear statocysts -> spatial orientation is not purely subjective., but is relative to the gravitational field the subject is in.
Biomimesis – importance of appearance in mimetic activities – display, camouflage. Use of bio-light effects by different species.
Conscious mimicry and intentional image projection – humans good at this. Ability to analyse this mimesis and separate it from the original function.
The military and projection, camouflage, deception.
DNA and RNA are codes and translation devices. They are not languages though, as they express nothing other than their own end products (proteins), which are not rearrangeable
Friday, May 26, 2006
Remarks on Dan Dennett: "Consciousness Explained"
Consciousness as an “emergent property” of the various whirrings going on in the brain.
Dennett… genesis of language and abstraction as “logic of possible re-enactment”.
Use of language for asking questions is fundamental. (Hence Cf Merleau-Ponty: we only have language because we want to do things. The intentionality of our discourse.
The faculty of language leads to the possibility of questioning oneself, to the positing of oneself and to the positing of other selves “central Meaners”. However we are capable of - and are nowadays -conceiving the next step: meaning without a central meaner, “Multiple Drafts” model.
(Dennett against the idea that since we integrate information successfully from all five senses, there must be a “central subject of sensation”. But according to Dennett, we can multitask sensorily and react without positing any such central thing, and experiments show the inability to integrate some sensory streams correctly into a definite “corresponding to central consciousness” narrative. Rather our speech narrative tries to integrate the different drafts, sometimes with success sometimes without.)
Has a lot in common with the Derridian idea of a text without an author and the indeterminacy of meaning, as Dennett notes later on.
[dd: Memory: the learned “refiring” of recent perceptive firings.] Hence Hume’s observation [where is that quote? In Neuroscience book?] of the obvious: all mental images [composed of fragments of things remembered] are much weaker than the most recent images (the most recent firing patterns).
Some experiments showing how the representation of temporal order is not necessarily the same as the actual temporal order. Further, it is not even possible for these to always coincide, as in “illusory” moving light spot experiment. Conclusion: there is no “actual temporal representation chronologically correlate with the ‘actual’ mental eventstream; instead, there is only a story we tell to ourselves and others about how it seems now to have happened.
Difference between what is represented and what is in our heads: p131:
“we have grown sophisticated enough to realise that the products of visual perception are not, literally, pictures in the head even though what they represent is what pictures represent well: the layout in space of various visual properties. We should make the same distinction for time: when in the brain an experience happens must be distinguished from when it seems to happen… The representation of space in the brain does not always use space-in-the-brain to represent space, and the representation of time in the brain does not always use time-in-the-brain”
On the illusion of well-defined atoms of (conscious or unconscious) experience
p319:
“If we individuate states (beliefs, states of consciousness, states of communicative intention, etc) by their content – which is the standard means of individuation in folk psychology – we end up having to postulate differences that are systematically undiscoverable by any means, from the inside or the outside, and in the process, we lose the subjective intimacy or incorrigibility that is supposedly the hallmark of consciousness… And the solution is…[to] replace the division into discrete contentful states – beliefs, meta-beliefs, and so on – with a process that serves, over time, to ensure a good fit between an entity’s internal information-bearing events and the entity’s capacity to express (some of) the information in those events in speech”
On the similarity between computer-storage (representation) of e.g. spatial information and the neuronal brain storage medium, p354.
“introspection provides us - the subject as well as the ‘outside’ experimenter – only with the content of representation, not with the feature of the representational medium itself. For evidence about the medium, we need to conduct further experiments. But for some phenomena, we can already be quite sure that the medium of representation is a version of something efficient, like color-by-numbers, not roughly continuous, like bit-mapping.
... your parafoveal vision … does not have very good resolution.. Yet we know that if you were to walk into a room whose walls were papered with identical photos of Marilyn Monroe, you would instantly “see” that this was the case… Since your eyes saccade [jump to centralise the next object for foveal vision] four or five times a second at most, you could foveate only one or two Marilyns in the time it takes you to jump to the conclusion and thereupon to see hundreds of identical Marilyns”
On blind spots, spatial and temporal, p355:
“The blind spot is a spatial hole, but there can be temporal holes as well. The smallest are the gaps that occur when our eyes dart about during saccades. We don’t notice these gaps, but they don’t have to be filled in because we’re designed not to notice them…
The fundamental flaw in the idea of “filling in” is that it suggest that the brain is providing something when in fact the brain is ignoring something. And this leads even very sophisticated thinkers to make crashing mistakes, perfectly epitomized by Edelman. ‘One of the most striking features of consciousness is it’s continuity’ (1989 [The remembered present: A biological theory of consciousness], p119). This is utterly wrong. One of the most striking features of consciousness is its discontinuity – as revealed in the blind spot, and saccadic gaps, to take the simplest examples. The discontinuity of consciousness is striking because of the apparent continuity of consciousness… As Minsky puts it, ‘Nothing can seem jerky except what is represented as jerky. Paradoxically, our sense of continuity comes from our marvellous insensitivity to most kinds of changes rather than from any genuine kind of perceptiveness’ [1985, The Society of Mind, p257].”
See also from p359 quote from Minsky [1985, The Society of Mind, p257]:
“We have the sense of actuality when every question asked of our visual systems is answered so swiftly that it seems as though those answers were already there”
See also M-P’s account of perception as the answer to continuous questioning about the environment for someone who has projects in that environment.
On the Cartesian residue of a spatial representation over and above our spatially oriented world of action Dennett p397:
“It may still seem just plain obvious that ‘the subjective colours you would be seeing things to be’ would have to be ‘one way or the other’…It may help to break down the residual attractiveness of this idea if we consider further the invited parallel with image-inverting goggles. When the adaptations of the subjects wearing those goggles have become so second nature that they can ride bicycles and ski, the natural (but misguide) question to ask is this: Have they adapted by turning their experiential world upside down? And what do they say? They say different things, which correlate roughly with how complete their adaptation was. The more complete it was, the more the subjects dismiss the question as improper or unanswerable. This is just what the Multiple Drafts theory demands: Since there are a host of discriminations and reactions that need to be adjusted, scattered around in the brain, some of them dealing with low-level ‘reflexes’ (such as ducking the right way when something looms at you) and others dealing with focally attended deliberate actions, it is not surprising that as the adaptations in this patchwork accumulate, subject should lose all conviction of whether to say ‘things look the way they used to look’ instead of ‘things still look different, but I’m getting used to it’. In some ways things look the same to them (as judged by their reactions), in other ways things look different (as judged by other reactions). If there were a single representation of visuo-motor space through which all reactions to visual stimuli had to be channelled, it would have to be ‘one way or the other’, perhaps, but there is no such single representation. The way things look to them is composed of many partly independent habits of reaction, not a single intrinsically right-side-up or upside-down picture in the head…there is just no saying what ‘counts’ as ‘my visual field is still upside down’.
The same is true of qualia inversion. The idea that it is something in addition to the inversion of all one’s reactive dispositions, so that, if they were renormalized the inverted qualia would remain, is simply part of the tenacious myth of the Cartesian Theater”
On the M-P, mystical ideas of the world as immediate and our coincidence with it by occasionally deconceptualising our conscious removals from it as “other”, see p407-8:
“It seemed to him, according to the text, as if his mind – his visual field – were filled with intricate details of gold-green buds and wiggling branches, but although this is how it seemed, this was an illusion. No such ‘plenum’ ever came into his mind; the plenum remained out in the world where it didn’t have to be represented, but could just be. When we marvel, in those moments of heightened self-consciousness, at the glorious richness of our conscious experience, the richness we marvel at is actually the richness of the world outside, in all its ravishing detail. It does not ‘enter’ our conscious minds, but is simply available”
Dennett… genesis of language and abstraction as “logic of possible re-enactment”.
Use of language for asking questions is fundamental. (Hence Cf Merleau-Ponty: we only have language because we want to do things. The intentionality of our discourse.
The faculty of language leads to the possibility of questioning oneself, to the positing of oneself and to the positing of other selves “central Meaners”. However we are capable of - and are nowadays -conceiving the next step: meaning without a central meaner, “Multiple Drafts” model.
(Dennett against the idea that since we integrate information successfully from all five senses, there must be a “central subject of sensation”. But according to Dennett, we can multitask sensorily and react without positing any such central thing, and experiments show the inability to integrate some sensory streams correctly into a definite “corresponding to central consciousness” narrative. Rather our speech narrative tries to integrate the different drafts, sometimes with success sometimes without.)
Has a lot in common with the Derridian idea of a text without an author and the indeterminacy of meaning, as Dennett notes later on.
[dd: Memory: the learned “refiring” of recent perceptive firings.] Hence Hume’s observation [where is that quote? In Neuroscience book?] of the obvious: all mental images [composed of fragments of things remembered] are much weaker than the most recent images (the most recent firing patterns).
Some experiments showing how the representation of temporal order is not necessarily the same as the actual temporal order. Further, it is not even possible for these to always coincide, as in “illusory” moving light spot experiment. Conclusion: there is no “actual temporal representation chronologically correlate with the ‘actual’ mental eventstream; instead, there is only a story we tell to ourselves and others about how it seems now to have happened.
Difference between what is represented and what is in our heads: p131:
“we have grown sophisticated enough to realise that the products of visual perception are not, literally, pictures in the head even though what they represent is what pictures represent well: the layout in space of various visual properties. We should make the same distinction for time: when in the brain an experience happens must be distinguished from when it seems to happen… The representation of space in the brain does not always use space-in-the-brain to represent space, and the representation of time in the brain does not always use time-in-the-brain”
On the illusion of well-defined atoms of (conscious or unconscious) experience
p319:
“If we individuate states (beliefs, states of consciousness, states of communicative intention, etc) by their content – which is the standard means of individuation in folk psychology – we end up having to postulate differences that are systematically undiscoverable by any means, from the inside or the outside, and in the process, we lose the subjective intimacy or incorrigibility that is supposedly the hallmark of consciousness… And the solution is…[to] replace the division into discrete contentful states – beliefs, meta-beliefs, and so on – with a process that serves, over time, to ensure a good fit between an entity’s internal information-bearing events and the entity’s capacity to express (some of) the information in those events in speech”
On the similarity between computer-storage (representation) of e.g. spatial information and the neuronal brain storage medium, p354.
“introspection provides us - the subject as well as the ‘outside’ experimenter – only with the content of representation, not with the feature of the representational medium itself. For evidence about the medium, we need to conduct further experiments. But for some phenomena, we can already be quite sure that the medium of representation is a version of something efficient, like color-by-numbers, not roughly continuous, like bit-mapping.
... your parafoveal vision … does not have very good resolution.. Yet we know that if you were to walk into a room whose walls were papered with identical photos of Marilyn Monroe, you would instantly “see” that this was the case… Since your eyes saccade [jump to centralise the next object for foveal vision] four or five times a second at most, you could foveate only one or two Marilyns in the time it takes you to jump to the conclusion and thereupon to see hundreds of identical Marilyns”
On blind spots, spatial and temporal, p355:
“The blind spot is a spatial hole, but there can be temporal holes as well. The smallest are the gaps that occur when our eyes dart about during saccades. We don’t notice these gaps, but they don’t have to be filled in because we’re designed not to notice them…
The fundamental flaw in the idea of “filling in” is that it suggest that the brain is providing something when in fact the brain is ignoring something. And this leads even very sophisticated thinkers to make crashing mistakes, perfectly epitomized by Edelman. ‘One of the most striking features of consciousness is it’s continuity’ (1989 [The remembered present: A biological theory of consciousness], p119). This is utterly wrong. One of the most striking features of consciousness is its discontinuity – as revealed in the blind spot, and saccadic gaps, to take the simplest examples. The discontinuity of consciousness is striking because of the apparent continuity of consciousness… As Minsky puts it, ‘Nothing can seem jerky except what is represented as jerky. Paradoxically, our sense of continuity comes from our marvellous insensitivity to most kinds of changes rather than from any genuine kind of perceptiveness’ [1985, The Society of Mind, p257].”
See also from p359 quote from Minsky [1985, The Society of Mind, p257]:
“We have the sense of actuality when every question asked of our visual systems is answered so swiftly that it seems as though those answers were already there”
See also M-P’s account of perception as the answer to continuous questioning about the environment for someone who has projects in that environment.
On the Cartesian residue of a spatial representation over and above our spatially oriented world of action Dennett p397:
“It may still seem just plain obvious that ‘the subjective colours you would be seeing things to be’ would have to be ‘one way or the other’…It may help to break down the residual attractiveness of this idea if we consider further the invited parallel with image-inverting goggles. When the adaptations of the subjects wearing those goggles have become so second nature that they can ride bicycles and ski, the natural (but misguide) question to ask is this: Have they adapted by turning their experiential world upside down? And what do they say? They say different things, which correlate roughly with how complete their adaptation was. The more complete it was, the more the subjects dismiss the question as improper or unanswerable. This is just what the Multiple Drafts theory demands: Since there are a host of discriminations and reactions that need to be adjusted, scattered around in the brain, some of them dealing with low-level ‘reflexes’ (such as ducking the right way when something looms at you) and others dealing with focally attended deliberate actions, it is not surprising that as the adaptations in this patchwork accumulate, subject should lose all conviction of whether to say ‘things look the way they used to look’ instead of ‘things still look different, but I’m getting used to it’. In some ways things look the same to them (as judged by their reactions), in other ways things look different (as judged by other reactions). If there were a single representation of visuo-motor space through which all reactions to visual stimuli had to be channelled, it would have to be ‘one way or the other’, perhaps, but there is no such single representation. The way things look to them is composed of many partly independent habits of reaction, not a single intrinsically right-side-up or upside-down picture in the head…there is just no saying what ‘counts’ as ‘my visual field is still upside down’.
The same is true of qualia inversion. The idea that it is something in addition to the inversion of all one’s reactive dispositions, so that, if they were renormalized the inverted qualia would remain, is simply part of the tenacious myth of the Cartesian Theater”
On the M-P, mystical ideas of the world as immediate and our coincidence with it by occasionally deconceptualising our conscious removals from it as “other”, see p407-8:
“It seemed to him, according to the text, as if his mind – his visual field – were filled with intricate details of gold-green buds and wiggling branches, but although this is how it seemed, this was an illusion. No such ‘plenum’ ever came into his mind; the plenum remained out in the world where it didn’t have to be represented, but could just be. When we marvel, in those moments of heightened self-consciousness, at the glorious richness of our conscious experience, the richness we marvel at is actually the richness of the world outside, in all its ravishing detail. It does not ‘enter’ our conscious minds, but is simply available”
Tuesday, May 09, 2006
Old notes 1992, for Tommy Teacakes
hi tom,
from my archives, the following...
Airdrie, 15.09.1992: James Gleick, "Chaos": p97 "..what is the dimension of a ball of twine? Mandelbrot answered, It depends on your point of view. From a great distance, the ball is no more than a point, with zero dimensions. From closer, the ball is seen to fill spherical space, taking up three dimensions. From closer still, the twine comes into view, and the object becomes effectively one-dimensional, though the one dimension.. makes use of three-dimensional space... A weakness in Mandelbrot's argument seemed to be it's reliance on vague notions, 'from far away' and 'a little closer'. What about in between? Surely there was no clear boundary at which a ball of twine changes from a three-dimensional to a one-dimensional object. Yet.. the ill-defined nature of these transitions led to a new idea about the problem of dimensions.
Mandelbrot moved beyond dimensions 0,1,2,3.. to a seeming impossibility: fractional dimensions...
Fractional dimension becomes a way of measuring qualities that otherwise have no clear definition: the degree of roughness or irregularity in an object. A twisting coastline, for example, despite it's immeasurability in terms of length [dd: i.e. in 1-dim measurement], nevertheless has a certain characteristic degree of roughness. Mandelbrot specified ways of calculating the fractional dimension of real objects, given some technique of constructing a shape or given some data..."
This is an "extension of the meaning" of the word 'dimension' - and certainly dimensionality is dependent on the possibilities of measurement: if we can measure in n directions at mutual right angles to each other, what we measure has n dimensions. .. what the fractal-dimension measures is not another quantity normal to the other 3 usual directions, but something different altogether. (Reason why time shouldn't be called "the 4th dimension"). - Although time measures too, and we can speak of it as a dimension - so long as we don't assimilate the different senses we have then given to the word "dimension".
"effective dimension" - interesting concept. Since we do seem to use it e.g. maps as essentially two-dimensional, meaning here that the dimensions of a map which represent do not include the thickness of the paper on which it is printed (nor the thickness of the ink which prints it) - "effective dimension" is a concept involved in subjectivity (and also in perception) - the twine is zero-dimensional for somebody (far away).
[Undated scribble at side]: No fractional time dimensions.
--
Airdrie, 16.09.1992: Gleick (op cit), p218: "[For the equation: x cubed - 1 = 0] ..Given any complex number as a starting point, the question was to see which of the three solutions Newton's method would lead to... [p219] Starting points that led to one solution were all coloured blue. Points that led to the second solution were red, and points that led to the third were green... A boundary between two colours never quite forms... no point serves as a boundary between just two colours... Impossibly[dd - !?], every boundary point borders a region of each of the three colours... [p220] magnified segments [of the boundary] reveal a fractal structure, repeating the basic pattern on smaller and smaller scales"
- Although there are areas of the complex plane not in the Mandelbrot set, it is not possible to draw the boundary - i.e. give the completed (spatial) description (picture) - between the points that do and don't lie in the set.
--
[Undated list]: "research interests"; how pictures represent e.g. maps. how dimension affects representation. measurement and dimension. Topology, and what shapes can represent what others. "infinite complexity", boundaries, chaos theory. Fractal geometry/shapes, dimensions. different sorts of space: topological space, n-dimensional space, phase space (space representing time); spatial metaphors. space and the logical possibility of movement. modal logic, geometry, and experience. photography, maps, pictures. projection and pictures (and Wittgenstein on).
--
Old musings posted on deckchair blogspot according to your orders SIR!
from my archives, the following...
Airdrie, 15.09.1992: James Gleick, "Chaos": p97 "..what is the dimension of a ball of twine? Mandelbrot answered, It depends on your point of view. From a great distance, the ball is no more than a point, with zero dimensions. From closer, the ball is seen to fill spherical space, taking up three dimensions. From closer still, the twine comes into view, and the object becomes effectively one-dimensional, though the one dimension.. makes use of three-dimensional space... A weakness in Mandelbrot's argument seemed to be it's reliance on vague notions, 'from far away' and 'a little closer'. What about in between? Surely there was no clear boundary at which a ball of twine changes from a three-dimensional to a one-dimensional object. Yet.. the ill-defined nature of these transitions led to a new idea about the problem of dimensions.
Mandelbrot moved beyond dimensions 0,1,2,3.. to a seeming impossibility: fractional dimensions...
Fractional dimension becomes a way of measuring qualities that otherwise have no clear definition: the degree of roughness or irregularity in an object. A twisting coastline, for example, despite it's immeasurability in terms of length [dd: i.e. in 1-dim measurement], nevertheless has a certain characteristic degree of roughness. Mandelbrot specified ways of calculating the fractional dimension of real objects, given some technique of constructing a shape or given some data..."
This is an "extension of the meaning" of the word 'dimension' - and certainly dimensionality is dependent on the possibilities of measurement: if we can measure in n directions at mutual right angles to each other, what we measure has n dimensions. .. what the fractal-dimension measures is not another quantity normal to the other 3 usual directions, but something different altogether. (Reason why time shouldn't be called "the 4th dimension"). - Although time measures too, and we can speak of it as a dimension - so long as we don't assimilate the different senses we have then given to the word "dimension".
"effective dimension" - interesting concept. Since we do seem to use it e.g. maps as essentially two-dimensional, meaning here that the dimensions of a map which represent do not include the thickness of the paper on which it is printed (nor the thickness of the ink which prints it) - "effective dimension" is a concept involved in subjectivity (and also in perception) - the twine is zero-dimensional for somebody (far away).
[Undated scribble at side]: No fractional time dimensions.
--
Airdrie, 16.09.1992: Gleick (op cit), p218: "[For the equation: x cubed - 1 = 0] ..Given any complex number as a starting point, the question was to see which of the three solutions Newton's method would lead to... [p219] Starting points that led to one solution were all coloured blue. Points that led to the second solution were red, and points that led to the third were green... A boundary between two colours never quite forms... no point serves as a boundary between just two colours... Impossibly[dd - !?], every boundary point borders a region of each of the three colours... [p220] magnified segments [of the boundary] reveal a fractal structure, repeating the basic pattern on smaller and smaller scales"
- Although there are areas of the complex plane not in the Mandelbrot set, it is not possible to draw the boundary - i.e. give the completed (spatial) description (picture) - between the points that do and don't lie in the set.
--
[Undated list]: "research interests"; how pictures represent e.g. maps. how dimension affects representation. measurement and dimension. Topology, and what shapes can represent what others. "infinite complexity", boundaries, chaos theory. Fractal geometry/shapes, dimensions. different sorts of space: topological space, n-dimensional space, phase space (space representing time); spatial metaphors. space and the logical possibility of movement. modal logic, geometry, and experience. photography, maps, pictures. projection and pictures (and Wittgenstein on).
--
Old musings posted on deckchair blogspot according to your orders SIR!
Tuesday, March 14, 2006
Summary of Maurice Merleau-Ponty: "Phenomenology of Perception"
(Routledge; trans Colin Smith. Quotes from the book are in single quote marks).
Perception is not a science of the world. Sensations are only determinate for us in so far as they are significant objects for our life’s (body’s) projects. The body is the vehicle of being in the world. The bodily subject is always involved in projects.
The body is an “object” which cannot leave me – so it is not really an “object” at all in any normal sense, it is an object which exhibits both physical spatiality and subjectivity; these features intersect in the non-causal nature of the body’s motility (a spatiality of situation and possible intentional movement, not a spatiality of position), and in the spatiality of perception and of the self (“My foot is the pain-area”; not, then: “I have a mental pain sensation, which I assign to the constructed or absolute space where my foot is”).
We should replace the extreme and idealistic dichotomy of “perception/object” and “subject” with a primordial, more accurate one, described by phenomenologists, in which we have ‘the world itself... contracted into a comprehensive grasp’ and the spatial body-subject with its motility.
The body constitutes an orientated space in which it lives, and space is always “set” in relation to the body and it’s possible motor projects. This is why e.g. in experiments when people wear vision-inverting spectacles, after a while their vision is reintegrated into their world and they are able to live in it. “Here” is not a place in objective space, it refers to where the body is. Everything we see, touch etc stands out against a double horizon of 1. objective- and 2. orientated(bodily defined)- space. It is the body-subject which learns possible movements and their actualisations, not the disembodied mind. Abstract movement requires the ability to have projects “in front of” a bodily subject. Consciousness is essentially “I can…”, and not: “I think that…”. To get used to a hat, a car, or a stick is to incorporate these objects into the intentional project of our body.
Language works by inducing similar intentional situations in other people, we understand the speaker’s projects, significances and movement through “re-enacting” as directed by his “sedimented” gestures. Language presupposes a primordial silence in which words first receive a use and a meaning through re-enactment. ‘This is why consiousness is never subordinated to any empirical language, why languages can be translated and learned’.
The spatiality of the bodily subject and it’s perception allows us to exist primordially i.e. without always assuming the subject-object dichotomy…’As I contemplate the blue of the sky I am not set over against it as an acosmic subject…it ‘thinks itself within me’, I am the sky itself’. There is no lucid, self-evident “experience of being the subject of my perception”. Sensation is prepersonal, primordial. All senses are spatial and all open onto the same orientated space, reaffirming for us the existence of the one world we inhabit totally. It is actually more difficult to “separate” sensation as philosophers try to do, since this goes against the natural tendency of sensation.
The privileged position of vision among sensations is that it seems to present greater spatially separated distances to us “simultaneously”, whereas tactile sensations explicitly take a certain time to “have”. But vision too implies the possibility of traversing the distance from a “here” to a “there”.
Using mescalin allows you to collapse some of the barriers established in the course of evolution between senses – ‘the sound of a flute gives a bluish-green colour’. This and other neuroscientific data e.g. the emotional aspect of colours, support the view of sensations as primarily carrying significance for our projects, and not of sensations as a putative bunch of atomic sense-data from which the subjective or objective world is to be philosophically (re-)constructed.
The focusing of the gaze is a prospective activity, drawn by the primordial anticipation of objects for our projects, a natural synthesis affected by our body and not an intellectual merging of two monocular images using perspective. Perspective is the derivative concept. Similarly, the various senses ‘interact in perception as the two eyes collaborate in vision’. Lighting is structurally different for us than what is lighted, it directs our gaze and our gaze can be thought of as a kind of lighting too. This is why lighting becomes “neutral” for us in perception e.g. indoors we quickly lose the “yellowness” of electric lighting. The other elements in the visual perceptual structure are the organisation of the field and the thing illuminated. The constancy of colour vision is only one instance of this constancy of the seen-thing-illuminated.
Tactile localisation of objects in space is by definition bodily. With touch, we intuit the bodily nature of perception more easily. Hence tactile experience ‘never quite becomes an object’.
Depth is usually thought of as “breadth seen from the side”, but it isn’t. Depth is logically given before any apparent sizes of objects, it is the possibility of bringing an object to be in front of me, in my intentional grasp. Similarly, breadth and height are derivative relations orientated according to my body, which defines the base coordinates.
The constancy of sizes and shapes in perception is not an intellectual synthesis, it is a bodily synthesis for our projects. Hence the moon on the horizon always appears larger than at its zenith.
Animals are not as clever as us and don’t have full consciousness (p327 – just have to disagree with this]
It’s impossible to conceive of a subject without a world – ‘any definition of the world would be merely a summary…conveying nothing to us’… the fact that primordially or pre-philosophically we perceive and have an idea of subjectivity, is actually a condition of being able to analyse it any further.
Being a bodily subject is not some kind of “limited subjectivity”, rather it is exactly this fact which gives us the chance to experience the world in its entirety.
The real is what is continually explorable and investigatable. The difference between hallucinations and real experience is that a spatio-temporal path logically exists both for the subject and the subject’s intersubjective companions to confirm the experience further.
When involved in dialogue or other projects with other people, “we have here a dual being… we are collaborators for each other”.
When I think of someone else, I don’t think of ‘a flow of private sensations indirectly related to mine through the medium of interposed signs’; instead, I have with me someone ‘who has a living experience of the same world as mine…as well as the same history, and with whom I am in communication through that world and that history’.
A mathematical hypothesis is already intuitively presumed to be true – without this intuition, we wouldn’t look for the “rational” proof to confirm it; as Socrates says in the Meno, we can’t look for something if we have no idea at all what we are looking for. A triangle is an act of the productive imagination, my power to always draw new triangles through a possible project of motor-movement or motility through space-time, and not the positing of a Platonic idea of a triangle.
Memory is an effort to “re-open” the past, including the tenses of relations to other events past and future to which it stood at that time. The time in which we live is essentially subjective. Past and future are defined against the present of and presence to a subjective body. When laid out as “before” and “after”, time loses it’s subjectivity, but for us to understand events we need to unlock the events in such a way that we resituate ourselves as the present in relation to other events – ‘I know that I was in Corsica before the war, because I know that the war was on the horizon of my trip there’ (p414). ‘Time is not a line, but a network of intentionalities’(p417).
Freedom is determined by what projects I have in the world. A rock is only an obstacle if something or someone wants to get round or over it. Free decisions also lead to commitments to not constantly abandon those projects which the free decisions set in motion. Freedom is not determined by motives or reasons, since there are always reasons to justify any decision.. We are not entirely free, in so far as we don’t choose everything about how the world we inherit now is (or was, or will be), or what our bodily possibilities are, but we are free in so far as we can decide on projects which can possibly be carried out.
‘Even a philosopher’s thought is merely a way of making explicit his hold on the world, and what he is’ (p455)
Perception is not a science of the world. Sensations are only determinate for us in so far as they are significant objects for our life’s (body’s) projects. The body is the vehicle of being in the world. The bodily subject is always involved in projects.
The body is an “object” which cannot leave me – so it is not really an “object” at all in any normal sense, it is an object which exhibits both physical spatiality and subjectivity; these features intersect in the non-causal nature of the body’s motility (a spatiality of situation and possible intentional movement, not a spatiality of position), and in the spatiality of perception and of the self (“My foot is the pain-area”; not, then: “I have a mental pain sensation, which I assign to the constructed or absolute space where my foot is”).
We should replace the extreme and idealistic dichotomy of “perception/object” and “subject” with a primordial, more accurate one, described by phenomenologists, in which we have ‘the world itself... contracted into a comprehensive grasp’ and the spatial body-subject with its motility.
The body constitutes an orientated space in which it lives, and space is always “set” in relation to the body and it’s possible motor projects. This is why e.g. in experiments when people wear vision-inverting spectacles, after a while their vision is reintegrated into their world and they are able to live in it. “Here” is not a place in objective space, it refers to where the body is. Everything we see, touch etc stands out against a double horizon of 1. objective- and 2. orientated(bodily defined)- space. It is the body-subject which learns possible movements and their actualisations, not the disembodied mind. Abstract movement requires the ability to have projects “in front of” a bodily subject. Consciousness is essentially “I can…”, and not: “I think that…”. To get used to a hat, a car, or a stick is to incorporate these objects into the intentional project of our body.
Language works by inducing similar intentional situations in other people, we understand the speaker’s projects, significances and movement through “re-enacting” as directed by his “sedimented” gestures. Language presupposes a primordial silence in which words first receive a use and a meaning through re-enactment. ‘This is why consiousness is never subordinated to any empirical language, why languages can be translated and learned’.
The spatiality of the bodily subject and it’s perception allows us to exist primordially i.e. without always assuming the subject-object dichotomy…’As I contemplate the blue of the sky I am not set over against it as an acosmic subject…it ‘thinks itself within me’, I am the sky itself’. There is no lucid, self-evident “experience of being the subject of my perception”. Sensation is prepersonal, primordial. All senses are spatial and all open onto the same orientated space, reaffirming for us the existence of the one world we inhabit totally. It is actually more difficult to “separate” sensation as philosophers try to do, since this goes against the natural tendency of sensation.
The privileged position of vision among sensations is that it seems to present greater spatially separated distances to us “simultaneously”, whereas tactile sensations explicitly take a certain time to “have”. But vision too implies the possibility of traversing the distance from a “here” to a “there”.
Using mescalin allows you to collapse some of the barriers established in the course of evolution between senses – ‘the sound of a flute gives a bluish-green colour’. This and other neuroscientific data e.g. the emotional aspect of colours, support the view of sensations as primarily carrying significance for our projects, and not of sensations as a putative bunch of atomic sense-data from which the subjective or objective world is to be philosophically (re-)constructed.
The focusing of the gaze is a prospective activity, drawn by the primordial anticipation of objects for our projects, a natural synthesis affected by our body and not an intellectual merging of two monocular images using perspective. Perspective is the derivative concept. Similarly, the various senses ‘interact in perception as the two eyes collaborate in vision’. Lighting is structurally different for us than what is lighted, it directs our gaze and our gaze can be thought of as a kind of lighting too. This is why lighting becomes “neutral” for us in perception e.g. indoors we quickly lose the “yellowness” of electric lighting. The other elements in the visual perceptual structure are the organisation of the field and the thing illuminated. The constancy of colour vision is only one instance of this constancy of the seen-thing-illuminated.
Tactile localisation of objects in space is by definition bodily. With touch, we intuit the bodily nature of perception more easily. Hence tactile experience ‘never quite becomes an object’.
Depth is usually thought of as “breadth seen from the side”, but it isn’t. Depth is logically given before any apparent sizes of objects, it is the possibility of bringing an object to be in front of me, in my intentional grasp. Similarly, breadth and height are derivative relations orientated according to my body, which defines the base coordinates.
The constancy of sizes and shapes in perception is not an intellectual synthesis, it is a bodily synthesis for our projects. Hence the moon on the horizon always appears larger than at its zenith.
Animals are not as clever as us and don’t have full consciousness (p327 – just have to disagree with this]
It’s impossible to conceive of a subject without a world – ‘any definition of the world would be merely a summary…conveying nothing to us’… the fact that primordially or pre-philosophically we perceive and have an idea of subjectivity, is actually a condition of being able to analyse it any further.
Being a bodily subject is not some kind of “limited subjectivity”, rather it is exactly this fact which gives us the chance to experience the world in its entirety.
The real is what is continually explorable and investigatable. The difference between hallucinations and real experience is that a spatio-temporal path logically exists both for the subject and the subject’s intersubjective companions to confirm the experience further.
When involved in dialogue or other projects with other people, “we have here a dual being… we are collaborators for each other”.
When I think of someone else, I don’t think of ‘a flow of private sensations indirectly related to mine through the medium of interposed signs’; instead, I have with me someone ‘who has a living experience of the same world as mine…as well as the same history, and with whom I am in communication through that world and that history’.
A mathematical hypothesis is already intuitively presumed to be true – without this intuition, we wouldn’t look for the “rational” proof to confirm it; as Socrates says in the Meno, we can’t look for something if we have no idea at all what we are looking for. A triangle is an act of the productive imagination, my power to always draw new triangles through a possible project of motor-movement or motility through space-time, and not the positing of a Platonic idea of a triangle.
Memory is an effort to “re-open” the past, including the tenses of relations to other events past and future to which it stood at that time. The time in which we live is essentially subjective. Past and future are defined against the present of and presence to a subjective body. When laid out as “before” and “after”, time loses it’s subjectivity, but for us to understand events we need to unlock the events in such a way that we resituate ourselves as the present in relation to other events – ‘I know that I was in Corsica before the war, because I know that the war was on the horizon of my trip there’ (p414). ‘Time is not a line, but a network of intentionalities’(p417).
Freedom is determined by what projects I have in the world. A rock is only an obstacle if something or someone wants to get round or over it. Free decisions also lead to commitments to not constantly abandon those projects which the free decisions set in motion. Freedom is not determined by motives or reasons, since there are always reasons to justify any decision.. We are not entirely free, in so far as we don’t choose everything about how the world we inherit now is (or was, or will be), or what our bodily possibilities are, but we are free in so far as we can decide on projects which can possibly be carried out.
‘Even a philosopher’s thought is merely a way of making explicit his hold on the world, and what he is’ (p455)
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